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Tuae TrRIUMPH OF THEORY In 1986, J. Hillis Miller was asked to give the Presidential Address at
the annual meeting of the Modern Language Associaton (MLA). Here,
Miller first proclaimed the “Triumph of Theory” that has preoccupied
English studies ever since—despite the fact that Stanley Fish, Walter Benn
Michaels, and others had only recently declared theory to be dead on the
pages of the Critical Inquiry.
What theory, or “Theory” or “high theory”, exactly is (or was), how-
ever, was never quite clear in these debates. Jonathan Culler’s famous
‘ansatisfactory definition’ is as good as anyone’s and should serve as a
starting point:
[Writings from outside the field of literary studies have been taken up by
people in literary studies because their analyses of language, or mind, or
history, or culture, offer new and persuasive accounts of textual and cultural
matters [...]. The genre of “theory” includes works of anthropology, art
history, film studies, gender studies, linguistics, philosophy, political theory,
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Most importantly, Culler highlights the fact that theories become ‘theory’
only when they are taken out of their original context: “The works in
question are tied to arguments in these fields, but they become “theory”
because their visions or arguments have been suggestive or productive for
people who are not studying those disciplines.” (Culler 3-4)
A closer look at Miller’s speech shows that the “Triumph of Theory’ is
an ambivalent matter: ‘The Triumph ofTheory, the Resistance to Reading,
and the Question of the Material Base’, as the full title reads, mentions
also the possible casualties of such a triumph (see Miller 1987, 81-91).
The aim of this chapter is to see whether these casualties can still be recu-
perated to, on a more ambitious level, suggest ways of doing (English)
Literary and Cultural Studies after Theory.
THE TRIUMPH OF LANGUAGE
If there is an official beginning to the “Triumph of Theory?, it is most
probably the publication of Deconstruction and Criticism, co-authored by
Harold Bloom, Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Hartman, and
J. Hillis Miller in 1979.1 The back cover ofa recent re-edition calls the book
no less than ‘a ground-breaking work that introduced Deconstruction to
the Western world’ (Bloom et al.). The five essays, as the original preface
reveals, were originally intended to concentrate on English Romanticism
and, especially, the poetry of Shelley. Although this plan was later aban-
doned, the presence of Shelley, and of one poem specifically, is still very
much noticeable within the book. The three ‘boa-deconstructionists’
(Hartman ix), as the preface calls Derrida, de Man, and Miller, concen-
trate on Shelley’s final, unfinished poem ‘The Triumph of Life’. Bloom
and Hartman, on the other hand, ‘barely deconstructionists’ (Hartman
ix), as the preface declares, mention Shelley only once each, focusing
instead on Keats and Wordsworth. Miller returned to Shelley’s “Triumph
ofLife’ in his 1985 book The Linguistic Moment.> Reviewing this ongoing
engagement ofMiller with Shelley, and “The Triumph of Life’ especially, it
seems not too far-fetched to suggest that Miller was thinking ofthe title of
Shelley’s poem when he declared the “Triumph ofTheory’ in 1986—even
though he does not even mention Shelley in his speech.
So what is it about “The Triumph of Life” that makes possible the
“Iriumph of Theory”, and deconstruction, the mother of all “Theory”,
in particular? As Christoph Bode and others have shown, the affinity of
deconstruction for Romanticism is no coincidence, their common denomi-
nator being the idea that language is the medium of thought (see Bode
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131-59). While the early Romantics might still have hoped to use the pro-
ductivity of language to go beyond language, at least since ‘the publication
of Deconstruction and Criticism’, as Tillotama Rajan has remarked, ‘the
[Triurnph of Life] has become a synecdoche for the self-effacement of
lan-
guage’ (Rajan 351). Welcome to the prison-house of langnage whereall
that is solid melts into thin air.
According to the famous words in de Man’s essay “‘ShelleyDisfigured’,
we should ‘understand the shape [= the ‘master trope’ of the poem] to be
the figure for the figurality of all signification’. Language, the poem appar-
ently shows, is rhetorical or nothing: ‘It follows that the figure is not natu-
rally given or produced but that it is posited by an arbitrary act oflanguage.’
For de Man as much as for Miller, Shelley’s poem performs and presents
the modus operandi of language as such: “The positing power of language
is both entirely arbitrary, in having a strength that cannot be reduced to
necessity, and entirely inexorable in that there is no alternative to it.” (de
Man 62-3) Language, de Man and Miller conclude, is both absolute and
arbitrary: for them, there is, indeed, “nothing beyond the text”, as the infa-
mous Derridean slogan goes, and the text cannot help but to reveal the ‘free
play [of the signifier] in relation to its signifying function’ (de Man 60).
For Miller, Shelley appears as an arch-deconstructor, poctically reveal-
ing an insight that theorists were able to grasp only more than a century
later: [The] act ofunveiling recurs as a basic trope throughout the poem.
Perhaps it is the most fundamental trope or turning. The unveiling is also
simultaneously a reveiling. One mask is dropped to reveal another mask
behind it.’ (Miller 1985, 140) ‘Mask after mask fell from the countenance/
And form of all’, Shelley wrote (Il. 536-7).3 And Miller (1985, 141) con-
cludes, somewhat apodictically: “To appear is to appear as language.” The
“Triumph ofTheory”, here, becomes a triumph oflanguage—over reality,
or rather: as reality.
Tue TrRiUMPH OF READING
The ineluctable nature oflanguage is central to Miller’s presidential address
as well. Consequently, for him, ‘the future of literary studies depends on
maintaining and developing that rhetorical reading which today is most
commonly called “deconstruction™ (Miller 1987, 289). Only if literary
scholars follow the path of deconstruction, can they circumnavigate the
pitfalls of idealism and materialism that apparently await those on both
sides of the political landscape. ‘Both the right and the left are united,’






ary or positional theory of language, the right from the vantage point of
an aesthetic view ofliterature and in the name ofhumanistic values, the left
from the vantage point of a commitment to history and the material base
(Miller 1987, 284) While the right hopes to keep up ideal values, the left
apparently sees such ideals as a necessary consequence of a material base,
that is, as its determinate superstructure. While the right ignores the words
on the page and looks straight for ideas, all the left apparently sees is society,
history, materiality. Both ignore, Miller claims, that it is language which
constitutes both ideas and history. “Rhetorical reading”, Miller suggests, is
the remedy against such ills.
To ignore the powers of language, Miller claims, undermines every lib-
erating project:
If you oppose theory from the so-called left, I say you should make com-
mon cause with those who practice a rhetorical study of literature [...].
Your commitment to history, to society, to an exploration of the material
base of literature, of its economic conditions, its institutions, the realities of
class and gender distinctions that underlie literature—this commitment will
inevitably fall into the hands of those with antithetical positions to yours as
long as you hold to an unexamined ideology of the material base. (Miller
1987,290-1)
Trying to look for a world beyond language, Miller suggests, is as naive
as it is futile. Instead, for Miller, reading for the rhetorical, topological,
performative, and positional dimensions oflanguage should be the central
task of literary studies, even for a Marxist. Only by following the path of
“Theory” can the liberators be liberated, Miller informs the “so-called
left”: ‘““Deconstruction” is the current name for the multiple and hetero-
geneous strategies of overturning and displacement that will liberate your
own enterprise from what disables... it.” (Miller 1987, 291)
The logic that de Man and Miller apparently deduce from reading
Shelley’s poem claims that language is everything, and everything lan-
guage; even “ideas” and “materiality” are mere products of language.
“The Triumph of Life’, de Man claims, represents ‘the undoing ofthe rep-
resentational and iconic function of figuration by the play of the signifier’
(de Man 61). Only by deconstructing the constructions of language, only
by revealing the world-making powers of language, Miller claims, can the
world be unmade and made anew. And indeed, many a project in gender,






  the amount of theses and articles on “gender/race,/class”, o
r later: “age/
 bility/sexual orientation”, i
n author x/y/z is legend.
«Reading” became the central met
hod of all so-called critical studies,
undoing the linguistic constructi
ons of gender, race, class (and
so on) their
saison dérve. 1f the world is mad
e by language, it is also where w
e have
to change it. For English studies s
uch an understanding of the lingui
stic
curn must have been like winning th
e jackpot: now you could go on doi
ng
what literary studies is suppose
d to be doing, reading, that i
s, and at the
same time you could engage with a
ll these important emancipatory pr
oj-
ects, liberating the unfree from t
he yoke of language. However,
books
about Bodies thar Matter, abo
ut Simians, Cyborgs, and Wom
en, about
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter an
d many other “things” came to
shake
the belief in pure signification, and
with it the bounds of English Studi
es.
THEORETICAL DOUBTS
As we know today, a naive under
standing of deconstruction and c
ul-
tural/social/linguistic constructivi
sm has long been refuted. As Wern
er
Hamacher has shown in the late 19
80s, an insistence on the figurality
of
all language could do nothing els
e but undo itself:
If the pathos of defiguration were act
ually the determining trait in the str
uc-
ture of literary texts, then paradoxica
lly, the reading that would corresp
ond
to its metonymic movement would b
e its metaphor. The text and its scien
ce
would converge in a figure—the fig
ure of defiguration—whose universal
ity
would delete its figurative character a
nd, in pure mediation, sublate both th
e
text and its science. (Hamacher 18
2)
By the 1990s, defiguring figurations
, deconstructing cultural construc-
tions, became a somewhat hollow g
esture, endlessly repeating its once
liberating gesture.
At the same time, Derrida himself f
elt the need to speak out against
those who followed him all too hastil
y in the name of deconstruction:
The phrase which for some has beco
me a sort of slogan, in general so bad
ly
understood, of deconstruction (“th
ere is nothing outside the text” [..
.]),
means nothing else [but]: there is not
hing outside context. [...] Once agai
n
(and this probably makes a thousan
d times I have had to repeat this, b
ut
when will it finally be heard, and w
hy this resistance?) as I understand
it
[...], the text is not the book, it







to the library. It does not suspend reference—to history, to the world, to
reality, to being, and especially not to the other, since to say ofhistory, of the
world, of reality, that they always appear in an experience, hence in a move-
ment ofinterpretation which contextualizes them according to a network of
differences and hence of referral to the other, is surely to recall that alterity
[...]is irreducible. (Derrida 1988, 136~7)
When Derrida declares that there is nothing outside the text, he explicitly
refuses to limit language to a free play of signification. Understanding is
determined as much by the text proper as by its context, as Derrida has
repeatedly emphasized, and this context is by no means restricted to other
texts in the vicinity of the text at hand, as New Historicism and other
limited understandings of discourse analysis have suggested. But why does
nobody want to hear what Derrida has to say (‘a thousand times’)? Well,
if English Studies took on board what Derrida suggests, reading would no
longer suffice. When there is no limit to the text, there is no limit to under-
standing a text, and consequently no limit to the academic work on a book.
LITERARY DOUBTS
Before exploring whether there is a way to approach literature that sees
‘the paper for the words’, I want to suggest a re-reading ofShelley’s poem
that questions Miller’s and de Man’s interpretation. Miller seems to be
vaguely aware ofsuch differing reading: ‘[The] determination of thought,
institutions and distribution of power is, as the rest of the poem makes
clear, not made by the light itself but by fictional figures that light takes
when it manifests itself on earth.” (Miller 1985, 124) Miller is right, of
course, when he insists that absolute knowledge is unavailable to humans.
(But who would doubt that doubt?) Nonetheless, some form of knowl-
edge seems to be available, a knowledge that ‘manifests itself” in “fictional
figures’. And it is these “fictional figures’ that in turn determine ‘thought,
institutions and distribution of power’ in the world—it is the presence of
these fictional, that is, made, figures that has real consequences in “life”.
However, for Miller such contingent knowledge is supplementary only: it
is what ‘the #est ofthe poem makes clear’—that very rest that Miller almost
completely ignores in his analysis.
Another reading of Shelley’s poem suggests that the constructions of
language, which the apparent ‘rest’ ofthe poem deals with, are as important
as the debunking ofall apparently absolute truths. ‘T desire to worship those
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old faded” (Il. 246-8), the speaker of the poem
says. To which his guide
‘Rousseat’ answers: ‘Figures ever new/Rise on th
e bubble, paint them how
you may;/We have but thrown, as those before us
threw,//Our shadows
on it as it past away” (IL. 248-51). Here, in
deed, we see the defiguration at
work that de Man and Miller celebrated: every fig
ure is undone before long.
As a consequence, a frustrated ‘Rousseau’ judges al
l attempts to escapethe
prison-house of language to be futile. The spe
aker, however, praises those
who draw new figures—despite their relative inst
ability. The speaker, here,
goes beyond both ‘Rousseau’s’ disillusioned r
omanticism and de Man’s
ironic detachment.
‘Rousseau’ still seems to be attached to the paradig
m of painting (‘paint
them as you may’), the paradigm ofthe synthetic ima
ge, ofthe symbol, and he
seems discouraged when the promise ofwholene
ss and authenticity is disap-
pointed. De Man reveals the futility of ‘Rousseau’s
’ attempts. The speaker
of the poem, however, does not speak of painting
; he celebrates drawing,
the production of sketches, oflines that produce new
figures on top of old
fading ones. The difference is crucial: whereas the
image that ‘Rousseau’
refers to can always be revealed as a deficient re-pre
sentation, the line that
Shelley draws leaves a mark one cannot go ba
ck on; what follows cannot
be completely arbitrary, but is influenced by t
he foregoing inscription.
Shelley, more than his thetorical-minded interprete
rs might have noticed,
draws attention to the materiality of the medium upo
n which the figures are
drawn. And it is this insistence on the materiality of t
he medium that distin-
guishes Shelley—and Derrida, for that matter—from d
e Man and Miller.
Shelley uses the image ofsand to figure the contingency
ofsignification:
And suddenly my brain became as sand
“Where the first wave had more than half erased
The track ofdeer on desert Labrador;
Whilst the fierce wolffrom which they fled amazed
‘Leaves his stamp visibly upon the shore
Until the second bursts—so on my sight
Burst a new Vision never seen before. (1l. 406-11)
According to de Man, this ‘scene dramatizes the failur
e to satisfy a desire
for self-knowledge and can therefore indeed be consid
ered as something
ofakey passage’ (de Man 45). Recounting this key pass
age, de Man claims
that ‘the water [is] washing away the tracks’ (de Man









transformation which ‘Rousseau’s’ brain undergoes is ‘said to be the era-
sure of an imprinted track’ (de Man 45). This transformation, in de Man’s
interpretation, is ‘a passive, mechanical operation that is no longer within
the brains own control: both the production and the erasure of the track
are not an act performed by the brain, but the brain being acted upon by
something else’ (de Man 45-6). And this something else is, of course,
language. ‘Consciousness,” Miller assists, ‘is phenomenality. But since, as
Hegel saw, consciousness speaks, [...] consciousness is linguistic through
and through—always, already, from the start.” (Miller 1987, 289) Every
figure of signification is soon disfigured and replaced by a new one: “The
process’ that acts upon the brain, de Man concludes, ‘s a replacement, a
substitution’, following an ‘erasure or effacement’ (de Man 46). For de
Man, the subjectivity of consciousness is undone by the work of significa-
tion: man does not simply use language, but is used by it.
Andindeed, those waves that roll on ‘Rousseau’s’ sandy brain do destroy
the wholeness of the image. The old image, however, is not entirely gone
when the new arrives, but is only ‘more than half erased’ (1. 406), as the
poem says. While the readings by de Man and Miller dismiss the impor-
tance of this modification, I hold the difference between a substitution
and something that is grafted upon remaining traces to be crucial. It is
the poem’s notion of the “track”, similar to Derrida’s insistence on the
importance of traces, that complicates Miller’s and de Man’s endless circle
of figuration and defiguration, their claim of a free play of signifiers.
Such a claim, as Hamacher has insisted, would be paradoxical to say the
least: ‘For although the referential content of an utterance is unreliable
and cannot be assured by any dialectically impassioned device, the conten-
tion that the utterance was liberated from all referential possibilities, a free
play of signifiers, would itself necessarily be referential.” Consequently:
‘No text has the possibility to exclude the possibility that it says the truth,
or at least something true; but no text can guarantee this truth because
every attempt to establish its certainty must proliferate the indeterminacy
of its meaning.” (Hamacher 182) What Hamacher criticizes here is de
Man’s and Miller’s strict opposition between an interpretation oflanguage
as an arbitrary process and one that claims necessity. That language, that
our interpretation of the world might be neither arbitrary nor necessary
escapes such reasoning. To go beyond this binary opposition of neces-
sity and arbitrariness, of conventions and their undoing, we need to go






  the poem, We have to move from the painting of an image to draw
ing a
line.
Derrida, in his engagement with “T
he Triumph of Life’, shows adis-
tinct sensitivity to the drawing of
lines over lines. Derrida highlights
‘the
clement of haunting that inundates
, if you will, The Trinmph of Life
, its
«ghosts,” “phantoms,” “ghostly sha
dows,” and the like’ (Derrida 1979,
106)—instead of the “forgetting”
that de Man emphasizes (see de M
an
50). What Derrida is interested in is th
e frightening fact that words might
well mean something—we just neve
r know when and what. The relati
on
between signifier and signified, the
n, is neither arbitrary nor necessary
,
but contingent. Central to such un
derstanding of language, asDerri
da
highlights in his interpretation of She
lley’s poem, is what he calls ‘writing
,
mark, traces and so on’ (Derrida
1979, 103).
However, all I present here is still no
more than mere reading: no more
than just another, media theory insp
ired, reading. An analysis of the po
em
that would go beyond mere reading
would have to start from the contin-
gent meeting of reader and text, medi
ated by the materiality of the book.
Such an analysis would have to take
into account the affective response
of a corporeal reader as much as the
interpretative labour of a cultured
mind, it would consider the practice
s a certain materiality affords as muc
h
as its effect on textual meaning-mak
ing, it would try to put significati
on
in context, a context that goes beyond
signification. Doing this, however,
would spell the end of this theoretical
essay, and the beginning of another,
historical examination. What I can pre
sent in the remainder ofthis chapter
is little more than a despairingly vag
ue sketch of what could be done, or
rather, how we could start to begin d
oing something else. Unfortunately,
there is no theory for such a practice
.
READERLY DOUBTS
“The triumph of theory,” Miller fears
towards the end of his Presidential
Address, ‘is the resistance to reading
in the sense that theory erases the
particularity of the unique act of read
ing.’ (Miller 1987, 289) A complete
“Triumph ofTheory’ would make impo
ssible every thorough engagement
with a text, if this triumph means tha
t we know what a text can and can-
not mean before we have even read
the text and have related it to its
specific context. Abstract theory can
never capture the uniqueness of art,
its historical and material specificity, M
iller knows. Miller also knows that
language, by using signs that can nev








specificities of history and materiality: he knows, too, that materiality is
that which ‘can never be approached, named, perceived, felt, thought, or
in any way encountered as such’ (Miller 1987, 289).
Nonetheless, despite all this, there is one event that brings the practi-
tioner of English studies as close to history and materiality as he or she
will ever be:
Perhaps the closest we teachers of language and literature can come in our
everyday work to glimpsing what we have erased, forgotten, or even forgot-
ten that we have forgotten is in that most ordinary of experiences for the
literary scholar, the act of holding 2 book in one’s hand and reading, that
18, confronting face to face the maveviality of the inscription. The trouble is
that the inscription makes the matter invisible once more, We do not see the
paper for the words. (Miller 1987, 289; my emphasis)
Here, the medium is the point where reader, meaning, andmateriality
come closest. Even if the weight of the signifier might habitually escape
the reader, the presence of the material inscription in the practice of read-
ing can be overlooked—but not denied. It appears as if Miller, somewhat
unexpectedly, suddenly begins to doubt the absolute centrality of “rhetor-
ical reading” to (English) Literary and Cultural Studies: if all exteriority is
finally eradicated, the book itself might disappear. However, Miller seems
to shun the consequence his sudden revelation entails. That anything else
but reading might be at the centre of English Studies does not seem to
appeal to him,
Future ENGLISH STUDIES: CORPOREALREADING,
MATERIAL MEDIA
What de Man and Miller, and those that followed them, seem to miss is an
understanding of the mazerial mediality oflanguage. While they highlight
the fact that thinking uses language as its medium, they seem to ignore
that language cannot be without 2 medium itself, and is therefore as lit-
tle—or as much, for that matter—in control of itself as the mind. Miller
and de Man fall prey to the invisibility of every medium at use (cf. Krimer
2008, 68). They do, indeed, fail to ‘see the paper for the words’, as Miller
himself had feared. Instead of analysing the sand and its capacity to make
imprints possible, to use Shelley’s trope, Miller and de Man have eyes only
for the figures that are imprinted. It is, as Sybille Krimer’s reinterpretation
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of deconstruction has insisted upon, the aim of media studies to bring the
paper to the fore and to analyse the sand that takes the imprint.
Media studies, at least in the “German” sense, moves beyond easily
defigurable acts of signification:
With the media aspect of signifying processes in mind—and there is no sign
without a medium~—something comes to the fore that does not follow the
formula of the conventional meaning of signs. The stamping potency of a
medium——and that’s the central thought here—unfolds itself in a dimen-
sion of meaning that goes beyond a semantics based on convention. It is
the materiality of the medium that provides for this “excess”, this “surplus”
of meaning which is not following the intention of sign users and is indeed
beyond their control. Due to their media materiality signs say more than
their users mean (to). [...] It is this phenomenon of the trace as opposed
to the sign that makes all the difference. (Krimer 1998, 78-9, my trans.)*
The ‘tracks’ in Shelley’s poem are not merely ‘posited by an arbitrary
act of language’, as de Man has it, but determined by the receiving sand
also, and less easily to be undone. Krimer reverses the direction ofpower:
whereas de Man was interested in the power—or rather: powerlessness—
of the stamp to imprint (lasting) figures, media studies draws attention to
the receiving material. Only when the form of the stamp and the form-
able material come together, do figures appear—and the place where form
and formability meet is the medinum. Media studies allows understanding
materiality and meaning as forms—formed by and from something other
than itself.
In Shelley’s poem, figuration and defiguration do not proceed as
smooth, steady, and repetitive as the waves on the beach might suggest.
Instead, the medium changes through repeated inscriptions, and with it
the possibilities to form figures. The medium—Shelley’s sand—is not sim-
ply an unconnected repertoire ofelements giving equal way to every figure
imprinted by the almighty powers of language, but a relatively structured
repertoire, contingently preferring certain combinations over others (see
Werber 171-98). This relativity of the medium, this contingency of the
medium, is determined both by the history of’its usage and by the materi-
ality of its make—not every sand is the same, and it never stays the same.








According to Lambert Wiesing, media are tools that allow distinguish-
ing between Genesis and Geltung (validity):
The term Genesis is generally used for all physical, material processes. Every
process of production or formation is identified—surely in a somewhat
emphatic terminology—as “Genesis”. [...] Such processes occur in space
and time; they are empirical facts and consequently can be analysed using
the means ofvarious empirical sciences. (Wiesing 241, my trans.)®
While there are, of course, many things in the world that can be ana-
lysed empirically, only media are able to use their materiality to create
something non-material, something that is not bound to space and time:
meaning—and precisely that is their Geltunyg: the existence of something
that is the same for different people at different times’ (Wiesing 242, my
trans.).5
Understanding media as meeting points of meaning and material-
ity might enable us to understand the form of the figure as an event (cf,
Gumbrecht 578-92). In this sense, we can reapproach the primal scene
of reading that Miller refers to: ‘that most ordinary of experiences for the
literary scholar, the act of holding a book in one’s hand and reading, that
is, confronting face to face the materiality of the inscription” (Miller 1987,
289). The materiality that Miller refers to here is not one represented, but
one manifested in the materiality of the medium itself, performed in the
corporeal (1) act of reading. Before all representation, before all referring
to some other materiality or idea, or rather: co-originary with it, comes
the aisthetic presence of the medium. Materiality might never appear as
such, only in the context ofmeaning, but equally, meaning only appears in
the context of materiality: the world we encounter always already means
something to us, and meaning is always already presented. Consequently,
I suggest that our encounter with literature—or any other cultural prod-
uct for that matter—should be understood as an act situated in time and
space, as a performance that can be examined according to factors of per-
ception, corporality, and staging (cf. Fischer-Lichte 7-26).
The task of a theoretically informed study of literature—that is, one
that knows that its object escapes all positivistic encounters—is precisely
not to forget its materiality and the specific particularity of this material-
ity. Once one accepts that a book is part of the world (as materiality) of
which it might not be part (as meaning), new alleys of research open up
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' how; how is the book produced, dist
ributed, circulated, and aisthetically
consumed; what is done with the book
, and to it. It is not through rep-
resentation that we can encount
er literature’s ‘economic cond
itions, its
jnstitutions, the realities of class and g
ender distinctions’, which Miller had
questioned, but through the—howeve
r precarious—presence of the cul-
rural product. Instead of analysing the
apparent ‘realities’ of gender, race,
class, age, nature (and so on), whic
h literature apparently represents
or
misrepresents, a practice-oriented appr
oach to literature could start with
the realities of the encounter between r
eader, meaning, and materiality.
Whatever the text means, and might be ab
le to represent, is a consequence
of this encounter: only because media h
ave a reality of their own, are they
able to produce realities (cf. Seel
356).
Literature can neither be understood thro
ugh its meaning nor its mate-
riality only, but only through the co-o
riginary presence and withdrawal
of meaning and materiality in the mater
ial-semiotic nodes we corporally
encounter as media (cf. Haraway 201).
Media open specific horizons of
possible meanings, but they are themselve
s only specific realizations within
a horizon of material and historical possi
bilities (cf. Engell 54). By com-
bining actuality and potentiality, media e
nable humans to live beyond that
place and #bar time the very act of perce
ption ties them to. If anything,
that’s the Triumph of Life.
NOTES
1. A date that Miller also alludes to in his ‘
Presidential Address’, although with
reference to de Man’s The Resistance to Theo
ty. The beginning of the rise of
theory can probably be dated to a 1966 co
lloquium on structuralism atthe
Johns Hopkins University, where Derrida, B
arthes, and Lacan met with Paul
de Man.
2. Although the respective chapter of the b
ook is entitled ‘Shelley’, it concen-
trates almost entirely on the “Trinmph’.
3. The poem is quoted after Reiman.
4. [Mlit der medialen Dimension vo
n Zeichenprozessen—und es gibt kei
ne
Zeichen ohne ein Medium—kommt e
twas in den Blick, was [das] Schema
vereinbarter Zeichenbedeutung nicht umst
andslos erfiillt: Die Pragekraft
cines Mediums—und das ist die Vermutung
, auf die es hier ankommt—ent-
faltet sich in der Dimension einer Bedeuts
amkeit jenseits der Strukturen
einer konventionalisierten Semantik. Un
d es ist die Materialitit des
Mediums, welche die Grundlage abgibt fiir d
iesen “(TberschuR” an Sinn, fiir
diesen  “Mehrwert” an Bedeutung,






keineswegs intendiert und ihrer Kontrolle auch gar nicht unterworfen it
Kraft ihrer medialen Materialitit sagen die Zeichen mehr, als ihre Benutzer
damit jeweils meinen. [...] Auf dieses Phinomen der Spur im Unterschied
zum Zeichen kommt es hier an.’ '
5. ‘Der Begriff der Genesis wird ganz allgemein fiir alle physikalischen
Vorginge verwendet. Jeder Herstellungs- oder Entstehungsprozess wird—
in sicherlich etwas emphatischer Terminologic—als “Genesis” angespro-
chen, {...] Diese Vorginge finden in Raum und Zeit statt; sie sind empirische
Tatsachen und lassen sich dementsprechend mit den Mitteln unterschiedli-
cher empirischer Wissenschaften erforschen.’
6. ‘und genau das ist die Geltung: das Vorhandensein von etwas, was fiir meh-
rere Personen zu verschiedenen Zeiten dasselbe ist’,
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